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Big Society, Small Government
Terry Boychuk
Under the slogan “Big Society, Small Government,” the 2004 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) endorsed 
efforts to construct a “system of social protection, including social secu-
rity, social assistance, and charitable undertakings,” in which “civilian 
organizations have become bridges and belts linking the Party and 
government with the mass, an indispensable force to promote eco-
nomic development and social progress, and play an important role in 
the harmonious development of a socialist civilization.” In addition to 
granting explicit official recognition for the first time to nonprofit orga-
nizations (NPOs) in China, the CPC also committed itself to expanding 
the nonprofit sector under the rubric of party leadership, government 
responsibility, and citizen participation. Put another way, citizens shall 
support the growth of the NPOs and these social organizations will 
assist the Chinese government, all under the broad direction of the 
CPC.
What are the prospects for China’s emergent nonprofit sector? One 
answer to this question is that the CPC is plotting a strategic retreat 
from authoritarian forms of governance and banking on unprece-
dented forms of devolution to manage the complexities of its rapidly 
transforming economic and social order. The creation of a broad stra-
tum of intermediate organizations situated between citizens and the 
state, in effect, represents the birth of civil society in China. Another 
interpretation is that the form and direction of the policy will likely 
reaffirm a time-honored tradition of fashioning social institutions into 
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closely guarded instruments of political rule rather than open-ended 
instruments of power sharing between a party-state and society.
From a liberal-pluralist perspective, the latter seems more prob-
able. Liberal-pluralists closely adhere to Tocquevillean precepts of civil 
society that emphasize the degree of independence of voluntary asso-
ciations from government supervision and regulation. In this formula-
tion, states should act as passive recipients and impartial arbiters of 
political demands arising from collectivities neither implicated in the 
formal apparatus of government nor subject to undue state influence 
in the generation of their political preferences. Moreover, civil asso-
ciations maximize the scope of individual and collective endeavors 
reserved for private initiative, and as such, minimize the scope of gov-
ernment action. By this standard, CPC rule precludes the emergence of 
a civil society in China.
From a neo-institutionalist perspective, however, the outlines of an 
emergent civil society in China are more apparent. Neo-institutional-
ists proceed from the assumption that state and society are relatively 
autonomous from each other, but never categorically so. State and 
civil society constantly interact and mutually reshape each other in 
both intended and unintended ways. Therefore, the object of analysis 
is to explore the continuum of state-society relations in comparative 
and historical terms, rather than deduce and apply fixed thresholds at 
which civil society is said to exist or not exist. For neo-institutionalists, 
civil society exists in degrees. For liberal-pluralists, civil society exists 
in kind. A neo-institutionalist approach frames the discussion here.
This essay develops in three parts. The first section presents a 
thumbnail sketch of historical trends in the nonprofit sector in the 
United States. The purpose of this discussion is two-fold. One is to 
generate a broader vocabulary for describing the contours of the non-
profit sector and the complex interactions between NPOs, state, and 
market. The other related aim is to provide a comparative benchmark 
for highlighting the salient characteristics of China’s developing non-
profit sector. The second part gives a brief overview of some of the key 
historical processes that have shaped the Chinese nonprofit sector and 
how they alternatively resemble or differ from the American case. The 
conclusion offers a brief speculation about the prospects of CPC efforts 
to strengthen the Chinese nonprofit sector, assuming that the commu-
nists will endure as China’s governing party for the foreseeable future.
One further caveat: The following analysis primarily focuses on 
NPOs commonly deemed charitable, otherwise called public benefit 
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NPOs. These are organizations that deliver education, research, health, 
and other welfare services, among other activities held to benefit broad 
cross-sections of society. The second branch of the nonprofit sector, 
grouped in U.S. law under the somewhat confusing designation social 
welfare organizations (i.e., mutual benefit associations and advocacy 
organizations), more generally pursues and represents the interests of 
a well-defined class of members (for example, trade unions, political 
lobbies, fraternal associations) rather than the general public or large 
segments of it. For charitable NPOs, political partisanship and advo-
cacy is secondary to their service mission both in practice and in law. 
For social welfare NPOs, the formulation, articulation, and defense of 
political and economic interests of partisan groups are often the rank-
ing objectives. Both classes of NPOs are important elements of civil 
society and overlapping tendencies appear in each. Students of civil 
society more often focus on the nature and extent of advocacy organi-
zations to gauge state-society relationships. This essay takes a different 
tack, in part to balance the disproportionate emphasis on advocacy-
oriented NPOs in current scholarship, and in part to draw attention 
to some of the continuities between Chinese and American societies, 
rather than glaring differences, again with an interest in presenting 
more balanced East-West comparisons.
I. Community, Society, Democracy, and Market: 
The Logics of American Civil Society
The ends and means of NPOs vary across place and time, as does the 
relationship between governmental, commercial, and nonprofit sec-
tors. What follows is a highly abbreviated schematic overview of the 
diverse patterns and practices that have marked the achievements of 
America’s charitable and civic associations in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. The concepts of community, society, democracy, and 
market provide heuristics for cataloguing a range of possibilities for 
the nonprofit sector. NPOs appear in many guises: deeply parochial, 
rivaling, and autonomous institutions operating beyond the reach of 
government oversight; federated agents of rationalization, cosmopoli-
tanism, and modernization; extra-bureaucratic extensions of govern-
ment agencies and programs; and highly commercial enterprises in 
competitive markets.
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A. The Communitarian Ideal
The communitarian ideal evokes images of town hall meetings, church 
assemblies, and a broad array of fraternal associations based on gen-
der, racial, ethnic, linguistic, national, and occupational identities and 
solidarities. These associations resemble Alexis de Tocqueville’s vision 
of America—the benign sociability of primordial communities peopled 
by citizens who live and work together and who share common values 
and norms. Tocqueville’s Americans voluntarily cooperated to man-
age almost every collective endeavor of public significance, save for a 
few responsibilities unavoidably delegated to a minimalist state, such 
as national defense, the administration of criminal and civil justice, 
and the protection of property rights. It is a civic universe of localism 
and parochialism that provides the wherewithal for the founding and 
maintenance of schools, colleges and universities, hospitals and asy-
lums for the sick and disabled, orphanages for abandoned children, 
reformatories for fallen women, and houses of industry and correction 
for the poor and the derelict.
The communitarian ideal, however fitting it was as a description of 
pastoral life in antebellum America, did not offer convincing solutions 
to looming civil disorder. Toquevilleans sometimes overlook the fact 
that civic life in nineteenth-century America could not contain endemic 
strife in the nation’s burgeoning cities stemming from racial, ethnic, 
religious, and class divisions. Grinding poverty, chronic sickness and 
epidemics, and rampant vice were also unrelenting, grim realities of 
urban living. Moreover, America’s civic culture and associations had 
failed to produce the moderation and compromise that would have 
averted a civil war.
B. The Civic Ideal
The post-Civil War era witnessed a profound transformation in the 
governance, financing, and aims of NPOs. Wealthy industrialists and 
financiers quickly displaced clerics from the leadership of the govern-
ing boards of civic and charitable organizations. Trained professionals 
increasingly assumed command of the managerial ranks of NPOs as 
well as claiming for themselves the bulk of permanent staffing posi-
tions, leaving to volunteers either honorific or auxiliary roles in the 
work of incipient civic bureaucracies, public and private. Professional 
fundraising drives targeting workplaces replaced religious congre-
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gations as the primary source of donations. As Max Weber would 
describe it, the nonprofit sector became rationalized. The logics of effi-
ciency, planning, coordination, and expertise now overshadowed tra-
ditional communitarian precepts of charity in shaping the ways and 
means of fielding social services.
As Paul Boyer notes, the rise of a new civic ideal marked the pas-
sage from gemeinschaft (community) to gesellschaft (society) in the Pro-
gressive Era. First, the Progressive movement ceded much of the field 
of voluntary initiative to government action. The challenges of cre-
ating sustainable urban environments required the massive transfer 
of responsibility for public health, safety, welfare, and basic utilities 
from commercial and communitarian associations to reforming state 
and municipal agencies. Apparently, Americans needed government 
after all, but of a different kind. Party dominance of city government, 
and the legacy of corruption and party patronage associated with it, 
increasingly came under attack by those favoring nonpartisan munici-
pal elections. Reconstructed executive branches of federal, state, and 
local governments headed up bureaucratizing and professionalizing 
civil services, and the rationalization of statutory law gradually sub-
stituted the rule of law for the much more arbitrary bent of party 
officialdom. Second, the civic ideals of progressive reformers left an 
expansive, if much reduced, universe of charitable and civic endeav-
ors to nonprofit organizations, but under similarly altered terms and 
conditions. While reconciled to the persistence of a nonprofit sector 
marbled with parochial affiliations—religious and ethnic—progres-
sives generated an expansive superstructure of coordinating and stan-
dardization agencies atop formerly competitive charitable institutions. 
It was an age of federations that centralized charitable fundraising 
through metropolitan agencies like community chests (the forerun-
ner of the United Way) and coordinated service provision through 
citywide associations like the Charity Organization Societies. This new 
civic ideal was decidedly cosmopolitan, emphasizing tolerance and 
mutual accommodation among pluralistic, and sometimes antagonis-
tic, charitable associations. The emphasis on interfaith and interethnic 
cooperation also carried with it secular tendencies. The natural and 
social sciences, now supported in America’s reformed colleges and 
universities, increasingly afforded the knowledge base, technology, 
and legitimacy for advances in education, health, and social services.
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C. The Democratic Ideal
The Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War brought yet 
another reconstruction of the U.S. nonprofit sector. Domestic and for-
eign policy imperatives elevated the federal government to unprec-
edented importance in American society. The favorable reception of 
Keynesian economics provided one rationale for dramatically inflated 
government spending. Mobilization for war was another. Yet another 
was the international appeal of the Beveridge Plan that extended the 
notion of citizenship beyond civil and political rights to include entitle-
ments to health care, education, old-age pensions, and unemployment 
insurance, in addition to adequate housing and other basic necessi-
ties. More specifically, U.S. leadership in the Cold War drew sustained 
and embarrassing international attention to the underside of American 
society: widespread poverty and the long delayed extension of civil 
and political rights to African-Americans. All these forces set the fed-
eral government to work constructing a new democratic polity, one 
with a renewed commitment to civil and political rights and new com-
mitments to social rights. In this radically altered context of American 
federalism, the future of the nonprofit sector now hinged on the dispo-
sition of presidents, congresses, and judiciaries.
Nonprofit organizations became key shareholders of growing fed-
eral largesse. Before the Great Depression, the prevailing logic embed-
ded in state and municipal policy was that public and private charities 
should operate independently of one another. Federal officials injected 
a radical bias into policies of human betterment. One of the signal 
objectives of national programs launched after WWII was to make pri-
vate institutions a primary recipient of federal spending on health and 
human services. This novel synthesis of public funding and private 
provision made NPOs indispensable elements of the modern welfare 
state and of government efforts to buttress the civil rights movement. 
Under federal sponsorship, the scale and scope of the nonprofit sector 
expanded exponentially in postwar America, as did government regu-
lation of NPOs.
D. The Market Ideal
The economic stagnation of the 1970s, the collapse of the Keynesian 
consensus, and the much debated crisis of democracy in the advanced 
industrial world prompted yet another far-reaching transformation 
Terry Boychuk
207
in government financing and regulation of NPOs. The New Deal and 
Great Society programs, in tandem with the civil rights movement, had 
greatly multiplied the beneficiaries of government social programs and 
escalated demands for new ones. The election of Ronald Reagan set in 
motion a broad set of policies to scale back demands on the federal 
treasury. First, under the rubrics of the New Federalism, the federal 
government reduced or capped federal spending on social services 
and transferred to state and local governments greater responsibility 
for subsidizing NPOs. Second, the Reagan Revolution inspired new 
policies for expanding the reach of private pension, health, and wel-
fare plans to lessen reliance on government-financed social programs. 
Third, Republican leadership enacted sweeping federal legislation to 
establish competitive markets in the human services sector of the econ-
omy, ostensibly to increase productivity and rein in cost inflation in the 
nonprofit sector.
Shrinking government subsidies, the growth of private welfare 
plans, and pro-marketization polices inspired a commercial transfor-
mation of the nonprofit sector. Faced with reduced public funding 
for non-paying beneficiaries and steep competition for fee-paying cli-
ents, NPOs retooled for profitability. They reduced their service com-
mitments to needy populations, aggressively marketed new services 
tailored to attracting wealthier patrons and clients, established for-
profit subsidiaries to expand their revenue base, and entered into joint 
ventures with business firms to develop and exploit new markets, 
especially in the fields of education, research, and health care. The 
aggregate effect of this commercial transformation of the nonprofit sec-
tor has been to blur the boundaries between for-profit and non-profit 
enterprises. NPOs are colonizing markets once exclusively reserved 
for commercial firms. For-profits have enlarged their presence in the 
realm of education, health, and social services—endeavors historically 
dominated by NPOs and government agencies—with the blessing of 
pro-market privatization policies.
As the foregoing suggests, static characterizations of NPOs that 
social scientists often equate with civil society (especially those wed-
ded to Tocquevillean ideals) simplify the complexities of, and gloss 
over important historical variations in, the accomplishments of the 
U.S. nonprofit sector. The differing, competing logics of civil society in 
the U.S. indicate several possibilities from which to construct associa-
tions that mediate relationships between individuals and the state, and 
that operate both inside and outside the boundaries of governmental 
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and business sectors. As we turn to a comparative analysis of Chinese 
NPOs, it becomes apparent that they combine several elements—some 
familiar, some unfamiliar—of these varied patterns of civil society.
II. Chinese NPOs and the Transition to Capitalism
The advent of Deng Xiaoping’s presidency dates the emergence of 
China’s contemporary nonprofit sector. Rural collectives and state-
owned industrial enterprises in urban areas provided a floor, how-
ever minimal, for economic and social security under Mao’s reign. 
The disbanding of rural collectives and the ongoing dismantling of 
state-owned industries in favor of private ownership of agricultural 
and commercial enterprises stripped away China’s pre-market sys-
tem of social provision without a well-articulated, comprehensive plan 
for its replacement. The rapid and sustained growth of social-service 
NPOs under state-sponsorship represented an interim strategy to fill 
the breach for Deng and his successors, and the outlines of a more per-
manent alternative to China’s transitional welfare state are still unclear. 
Consequently, the nonprofit sector remains suspended in the inter-
stices between socialism and capitalism, as with much else in China, 
and is marked by conflicting tendencies associated with each.
China’s interstitial nonprofit sector bears important similarities to 
the American one. Both Chinese and U.S. governments have lodged 
broad responsibilities for educational, health, and social services with 
NPOs. Each polity has done so with massive government subsidies in 
one era followed by retrenchment in another. The current aim of U.S. 
and Chinese public policy is to field nonprofit sectors that can absorb, 
deflect, or defer demands on the state for more spending on social 
programs by offsetting shrinking public resources with more private 
income from donations and commercial revenues. National govern-
ments in both countries have increasingly charged local, provincial, 
and state authorities with overseeing the transition and with renegoti-
ating the relationship between government and NPOs. The boundaries 
between the nonprofit and commercial sectors are blurring. NPOs in 
each nation must strike a precarious balance between the democratic 
ideal (the provision of a social minimum) and the market ideal (gov-
ernment load-shedding).
These parallels, however, overlay highly disparate historical con-
texts in which the American and Chinese nonprofit sectors originated 
and matured. Communitarian ideals and practices provided the fun-
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daments of the American nonprofit sector, even if contemporary NPOs 
bear only a slight resemblance to their nineteenth-century antecedents. 
The material of China’s emergent nonprofit sector is patched together 
from the remnants of a socialist polity assuming a greater role in the 
global economic order and striving for broadly accepted and respected 
participation in the international civic order. Under these circum-
stances, nineteenth-century American shibboleths may have limited 
applicability or relevance. From the standpoint of Chinese efforts to 
develop a reputation for responsible global citizenship, a nonprofit 
sector with immediate potential to address global issues in realms such 
as public health, environmental protection, and international peace 
and security becomes a matter of some importance. The uncertain 
prospects of generating uniquely indigenous NPOs with strong affini-
ties for coordinating their activities with international agencies has 
often been resolved in favor of deliberate, state-guided attempts to 
ensure a degree of compatibility between national and transnational 
associations. Such commonly observed elements of state mediation in 
developing nations—voluntarily or involuntary engaged in harmoniz-
ing their domestic nonprofit sectors with international networks of 
NPOs that have crystallized in the developed world—often involves 
reliance on extensive international aid, as is the case with China.
The architecture of the Chinese nonprofit sector bears the imprint of 
international considerations and forces not easily reconciled with the 
highly romanticized grassroots image of Tocquevillean civil society. 
Domestic contingencies and imperatives have also shaped the devel-
opment of Chinese NPOs in unconventional ways. The launching of 
the nonprofit sector coincides with concerted efforts to pare away vast 
layers of officialdom that accumulated under socialism. The staffing, 
financing, and governance of NPOs point to an expanding sector that 
serves both as an outlet for déclassé state functionaries and disap-
pointed aspirants for government employment as well as a vehicle 
for new forms of social initiative. The need to absorb a large surplus 
labor force tailored for public sector careers may also account for the 
enduring dependence of Chinese NPOs on liberal government fund-
ing. Chinese governments have not gambled on deep, lasting cuts in 
state subsidies to the nonprofit sector that might swell the nation’s 
legions of unemployed. They have, however, strongly encouraged 
NPOs to generate alternative sources of revenue, most commonly from 
user fees and other direct charges to beneficiaries of agency services, 
in addition to overseas aid. In terms of government supervision, the 
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requirement that NPOs must officially register and operate only with 
the approval of a sponsoring government department or a CPC-sanc-
tioned mass organization is consistent with the fiscal underpinnings 
of the nonprofit sector. Funding begets regulation. The practice also 
conforms to historical precedent in other Asian societies. Apart from 
basic concerns over accountability for government spending, the uses 
of sponsorship are many. Discouraging organizations from working 
at cross-purposes with government policy and containing threats to 
national security often rank among them. Asian patterns of official 
sponsorship also demonstrate a greater preoccupation with moderat-
ing social tensions stemming from ethnic, religious, and other partisan 
identities. Government agencies give preference to singular integrative 
associations—rather than multiple competing ones—operating in any 
given realm of philanthropic endeavors.
Lastly, it is worthwhile to recall the differences that separate the U.S. 
and China in terms of economic development. Sustained growth over 
the course of the twentieth century yielded ample surpluses for U.S. 
policymakers to divert into social programs that buoyed the American 
nonprofit sector. China faces much starker trade-offs between invest-
ing in social entitlements and government measures that will speed 
economic growth. Furthermore, it must confront agonizing choices 
about the relative importance of public and private funding of health 
and human services. Private donations cover only a small fraction of 
the operating costs of NPOs in advanced welfare states. The economic 
viability of the nonprofit sector in the long run will rest on the growth 
of government-financed and administered social insurance and assis-
tance programs, or the widespread adoption of corporate-sponsored 
and privately administered benefit plans, or some combination of the 
two. The latter requires several layers of intermediary organizations, 
commercial and nonprofit, that variously coordinate the associated 
efforts of employers, employees, insurance carriers, and service provid-
ers—all within a highly regulated environment. Whether under state or 
corporate sponsorship, the experience of developed nations indicates 
this much: the requisite institution-building needed to finance and 
administer social security programs has been the slow boring of hard 
boards. At present, China’s incipient social programs for pensions, 
unemployment, and health insurance cover less than one-eighth of 
the employed population. For a nation whose comparative advantage 
in the global economy depends on low wages, any movement to raise 
labor costs with broad-based social insurance taxes or other employer-
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subsidized welfare plans may drive investors into other reaches of the 
world’s abundant supply of cheap labor markets.
III. Big Government, Big Society
The notion of tapping into vast reserves of latent social and economic 
capital to address pressing social problems is a tempting one for China’s 
overextended government, now seeking to balance the twin impera-
tives of assembling the infrastructure for a private enterprise economy 
and of moderating the widespread social dislocations of rapid develop-
ment. Nonetheless, the historical experience of the world’s most afflu-
ent nation should temper any expectations in developing societies that 
expanding the scale and scope of the nonprofit sector will produce a 
windfall of voluntary efforts destined to relieve states of extensive obli-
gations to finance and organize a broad spectrum of social programs 
that afford their citizens a minimum standard of living. Nonprofit 
sectors in the developed world operate within the context of elaborate 
government-mandated social insurance schemes, widespread gov-
ernment subsidies (direct and indirect) to NPOs, and supplemental 
employer-financed benefit plans that provide highly routinized fund-
ing for NPOs devoted to organizing educational, health, and social 
welfare services. Governments and NPOs most commonly operate as 
complements to each rather than as substitutes. A strong civil society 
requires vigorous, effective governments as well as prospering econo-
mies.
Current efforts to level government spending on social entitlements 
in the advanced industrial democracies have endeavored to shift more 
responsibilities for social welfare onto individuals, families, workers, 
corporations, private insurance and investment markets, and NPOs. 
Yet the rhetoric and the realities of privatization sometimes differ. 
The much-heralded third way has not unraveled the complex interde-
pendence of government, business, and nonprofit sectors in modern 
welfare states. The primary achievements of concerted efforts at load-
shedding have been to cap government spending, head off demands 
for expanding existing social programs or for creating new ones, and, 
most predictably, to create or bolster markets in pensions, health care, 
education, and other social services that primarily benefit groups in 
the upper reaches of occupational and organizational hierarchies. In 
this new political economy of the nonprofit sector, the redistributive 
potential of NPOs is marginal at best. If the American experience is 
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any guide, Chinese authorities cannot and should not expect their 
emerging nonprofit sector to bridge grave economic disparities of its 
own accord or to lower the barriers to basic human services, issues that 
represent an ongoing challenge to maintaining peace in a fragile social 
order.
The uses of an expanding nonprofit sector in China will likely 
remain selective rather than exhaustive. Some forms of social capital 
are much more compatible than others with the principles of Demo-
cratic Centralism and of Communist Party rule. The communitarian 
ideal has strong affinities with religious and ethnic factionalism that the 
CPC has doggedly sought to keep in check. Nonetheless, opening the 
field of social policy making to provincial and municipal initiative has 
strong appeal for China’s overtaxed central government. The civic ideal 
is altogether more congenial to CPC precepts of the harmonious society, 
given its non-partisan leanings. Some elements of the democratic ideal, 
most notably the growth of a state initiated, financed, and regulated 
nonprofit sector to field a wide range of human services, are consistent 
with historical and current practices in China. Presumably, the use 
of government grants-in-aid to underwrite advocacy organizations is 
one legacy of the democratic ideal in the U.S. to which the CPC will 
not assign high priority. And lastly, the market ideal may find some 
place in the landscape of China’s evolving nonprofit sector. Most every 
social welfare regime tolerates private sector alternatives to publicly 
financed and administered services for citizens who prefer to spend 
more on educational, health, and social benefits than governments 
budgets allow. Nonprofit organizations act as a safety valve for chan-
neling discontent with public services among citizens of means into 
politically less troublesome alternatives. These commonly observed 
arrangements for opting out of public services are still a far cry from 
establishing and subsidizing competitive markets in human services 
among government, for-profit, and nonprofit organizations. As yet, the 
notion of multiple competing suppliers of public goods and services is 
still foreign to Chinese law and practice. •
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